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Abstract
The more information is available, and the more predictable are events,
the better forecasts ought to be. In this paper forecasts by bookmakers,
prediction markets and tipsters are evaluated for a range of events with
varying degrees of predictability and information availability. All three
types of forecast represent different structures of information processing
and as such would be expected to perform differently. By and large, events
that are more predictable, and for which more information is available,
do tend to be forecast better.
1 Introduction
The more information is available, and the more intrinsically predictable are
events, the better forecasts ought to be. Further, the manner in which forecast
models process that information must matter for forecast quality. In this pa-
per we investigate these basic tenets of forecasting theory using three market-
based mechanisms for generating forecasts of sporting outcomes; we consider
traditional bookmakers, prediction markets, and the forecasts of a self-selected
group of experts, or tipsters, for a range of sporting events. While all three are
market based and hence subject to commercial pressures which may influence
forecasts produced, the context of sports betting is a highly competitive mar-
ket in which poor forecasts embodied in offered odds (prices) would be either
ignored by agents who can bet elsewhere, or exploited to make guaranteed re-
turns. As such we argue there are strong incentives for accurate forecasts to be
produced. We consider a large number of football matches in England across
a range of divisions; these different divisions, or leagues, provide us with events
that have different associated costs to procure information, and different levels
of predictability.1 The mix of bookmakers, traders on prediction markets and
tipsters providing forecasts yields a range of different types of forecasts that
will rely, to differing extents, on statistical models and judgement, and are also
subject to differing degrees of market pressures. As we are evaluating different
aspects of the betting industry, we also investigate the favourite-longshot bias,
commonly found in previous empirical investigations.
1When using the term ‘football’ in this paper, we are referring to Association Football, or
soccer for short.
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We assess forecasts produced by our different sources for a common set
of events using a number of frequently used metrics before evaluating a small
number of basic trading strategies based upon different forecasts. We find that,
consistent with commercial pressures, tipster forecasts are inferior to those from
bookmakers and prediction markets, and we argue our results lend tentative
support to one particular, information-centred explanation for the favourite-
longshot bias. Finally we find that different strategies based on bookmakers
and prediction markets yield different, but never significantly positive, expected
returns.
In Section 2 we introduce our different forecast models and outline how we
will compare them, in Section 3 we introduce our dataset, in Section 4 we present
the results of our comparisons, and in Section 5 we conclude.2
2 Methodology
Forecasting outcomes has always been an important pursuit of economists, and
as such, various methods have been developed to carry out such forecasts. All
methods differ, fundamentally, in how they process the available information,
and it is that information availability that in part determines to what extent
an event is forecastable (see, for example Hyndman and Athanasopoulos, 2012).
Statistical models can be used (see, for overviews Hendry and Clements, 1998,
2001), while judgemental methods rely more on the judgement of agents involved
(see, for example Lawrence et al., 2006; Goodwin and Wright, 1993). Agents
in various common situations generate forecasts based on some combination of
these two approaches; for example during political elections pollsters produce
forecasts regarding vote shares by sampling the population, and in sporting
events bookmakers produce forecasts regarding outcomes. Bookmakers are one
vehicle through which agents can trade based on predictions; assuming a clas-
sical framework agents will bet with a bookmaker up to the point where their
subjective beliefs, or forecasts, regarding outcomes differ from those posted pub-
licly by bookmakers. In recent years prediction markets such as Betfair (see
www.betfair.com) have allowed agents to trade contracts with each other, con-
tracts whose value is contingent on the outcome of some forthcoming event,
based on their forecasts regarding those outcomes. Prediction markets differ
fundamentally from bookmakers in that the prices offered are those offered by
other willing bettors, rather than by a bookmaker. Furthermore, as a predic-
tion market does not take one side of bets agreed on it, it has no exposure to
losses caused by unexpected outcomes of events. Historically for political and
sporting events, experts have pronounced opinions, often in newspapers, regard-
ing outcomes, and these predictions have been analysed (Forrest and Simmons,
2000), in particular, regarding their use of information, both public and private.
Finally, fora have always existed for agents to share predictions without taking
financial positions based upon them; Servan-Schreiber et al. (2004) analyse one
such forum, a market in which users trade based on virtual money for ‘brag-
ging rights’ rather than financial return, but many other formal (e.g. fantasy
leagues) and informal institutions (e.g. discussions amongst friendship groups)
2The data collected for this study was scraped using Python (see www.python.org/, and
the econometric analysis carried out in R (R Core Team, 2014). Some of the tables were
created using stargazer (Hlavac, 2014).
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exist for this purpose, online (e.g. the Hollywood Stock Exchange) and oﬄine
(e.g. office sweepstakes).
In this paper a novel dataset is exploited in order to compare the forecasts
from these three sources: bookmakers, prediction markets and tipsters. The
website www.oddsportal.com lists prices published by bookmakers, and those
available on prediction markets, immediately prior to the start of historical
sporting events. Alongside these prices are the predictions of numerous website
users for the events in question. The website, as its name suggests, collects odds
for the information of those seeking to place bets on sporting outcomes. As such,
we can reasonably presume that those users who post their own forecasts also
bet on these match outcomes. The website has a ‘community’ in which users
post forecasts, and other can comment on them, should they choose. For any
given historical match, a summary of these user forecasts, alongside bookmaker
and betting exchange odds, is provided, and as such we have a significant range
of forecasts per match, differing in their processing of public (and potentailly
private) information. The existence of a website such as this one is indicative of
the level of competition that exists amongst bookmakers; this is the culmination
of a dramatic change in sports betting markets operating in the UK; Forrest
et al. (2005) discuss the onset of this change in the late 1990s, and it is likely
that their dataset, covering 1998 to 2003, covers the greatest period of structural
change as competitive pressure increased. Our dataset, collected for the period
2011–2014, comes after much of that structural and legislative change has taken
place, and hence covers a more settled market setting, but one nonetheless that
appears very highly competitive.
Through the types of matches we collect data on, we also have a range of
characteristics of events being forecast. We collect data for the top five En-
glish football leagues; we take the almost complete current seasons, plus the
previous two complete seasons, for the English Premier League (EPL), the En-
glish Championship (ECH), League One (LG1), League Two (LG2), and the
Conference Premier Division (CPD). The EPL is the top professional football
league in England, and is widely considered to be one of the top football leagues
globally. The Championship is the league immediately below the Premiership,
and within the ranks of second tier leagues globally, it ranks highest both in
terms of product quality and quantity demanded.3 LG1 and LG2 are the subse-
quent two professional (Football League) divisions and together with ECH they
form the Football League, and the CPD is the fifth division of English football,
where many teams are only semi-professional. European-style football leagues
are distinct from North American-style ones by the presence of promotion and
relegation — movement between a hierarchy of leagues based on the realised
quality of teams competing. Hence, for example, there is direct movement
between the ECH and the EPL; the three best team from the ECH move into
the EPL (promotion), and the three worst teams from the EPL move into the
ECH (relegation), each year. Promotion and relegation is possible between
any two adjacent leagues in the pyramid system (hence also between ECH and
LG1, though not directly from LG1 to EPL). As the EPL is the top league
in England, there is no promotion from it to any higher league, whereas for all
other divisions there is both promotion and relegation.4 This feature likely con-
3For the former, see www.transfermarkt.de/en/2010/startseite/wettbewerbeDE.html?from=top navi,
and for the latter, see comparetheleagues.com/european-league-stats/second-divisions/.
4The pyramid structure of English football is such that it continues down to very sub-
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Figure 1: Search frequencies for the different football leagues considered in our
dataset, revealing the different levels of interest and hence information available
on each. Source: Google Trends.
tributes to the quality differences observed between teams in the EPL relative
to the two other leagues; the best teams remain each year rather than enter a
higher league, and as such the distribution of team quality might be expected to
be more skewed, on average, as a result. The statistics appear to support this;
for the 2013/14 season, the excess skewness for EPL average team quality was
almost twice that of the ECH and around nine times that of the CPD. If there
are larger quality differences between teams, this makes the events intrinsically
more predictable.
The quality of forecasts must also be a function of available information. By
information we refer to detailed information regarding teams as they approach
each match, rather than simply the measured quality of teams competing. For
example, whether a team is suffering from injuries, fatigue, other types of un-
rest, and whether conditions at a forthcoming match will favour one team over
another. By and large, this kind of information is much more readily available
for matches in the top leagues, hence EPL in particular, and ECH, as media
interest is more focussed on these leagues. Figure 1 lends support to this in-
formation hypothesis, as it plots search frequencies on Google for the leagues
our dataset covers. The EPL has, over the period our data covers (since 2011),
about seven times as many searches as the entire Football League combined
(ECH, LG1 and LG2), and more than a hundred times as many searches as the
CPD has. Google searches can be viewed as a proxy for demands for informa-
tion about these leagues and gives some sense of the differences between them.5
As such, we propose that forecasts will be better for the EPL than the four
leagues beneath it, as both more information is known about this league, and as
mentioned, the quality differences between teams are greater also. We might
regional, amateur levels. The pyramid as a whole contains 120 leagues with 480 divisions
(see http://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/English football league system).
5It is likely that this comparison is favourable to the CPD as “football conference”, the
search term used, picks up a number of North American ‘conference’ leagues.
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anticipate a steady deterioration in forecast quality as we move to lower leagues,
and based on the information hypothesis regarding the favourite-longshot bias,
we might also anticipate that this bias gets larger the lower the league we are
considering, as the costs of obtaining important information are higher. That
said, however, both Forrest et al. (2005) and Forrest and Simmons (2000) refer
to the ‘broken-leg cue’, bits of information that may be picked upon more likely
by bookmakers, bettors and tipsters if media coverage is greater, as potentially
detrimental if rather than providing important information, it only provides
noise. It may be that all the extra information available at higher levels, rather
than providing actual signals about changes in relative team quality, actually
provides only noise and thus makes forecasts worse.
It is naturally of interest to understand which forecast methods perform best;
for bettors this may inform better strategies to make better returns, whilst of
more academic interest principles of forecasting theory can be evaluated. In
comparing such different sources of forecasts, this paper is similar in nature
to Spann and Skiera (2009), who compare forecasts by the German state-run
bookmaker Oddset, from a German virtual prediction market, and by a tipster
at the leading German sports newspaper, Sport Bild.6 They find that tipster
forecasts are inferior to both their bookmaker and prediction market, and note
that with lesser commission charges, a trading strategy building on prediction
market forecasts could yield positive expected returns. Our study differs from
Spann and Skiera as we consider multiple competing bookmakers, alongside
commercial prediction markets that compete with bookmakers, and we look
at a self-selected group of tipsters rather than professional ones employed by
newspapers.
Before describing our methods for comparing these forecast sources, we in-
troduce our notation. We refer to outcome k of football match i as yik such
that:
yik =
{
1 if event k occurs in match i,
0 otherwise.
(1)
The existence of a tied outcome, or draw in more common parlance, distin-
guishes football from numerous other sports, particularly those of North Amer-
ican flavour. While adjustments could be made to factor in the tied outcome,
for our purposes it is sufficient simply to consider the drawn match outcome as
another possible outcome of a match. Hence in (1) k refers to three possible
outcomes: the home team wins, a draw, or the away (visiting) team wins. We
observe forecasts of these three outcomes from three different sources: book-
makers, prediction markets and tipsters, and refer to such forecasts as ŷiks for
match i, event k, and forecast source s. Forecasts ŷiks are bounded between
zero and one; we convert all forecasts into probabilistic forecasts, as both book-
makers and prediction markets report their forecasts in terms of decimal odds,
denoted Diks. We convert decimal odds into probabilities by inverting them,
hence ŷiks = 1/Diks. We must correct bookmaker and prediction market odds
for the overround; if the raw probabilities taken from the reciprocal of the dec-
imal odds are summed up for all, their total is usually greater than one. The
overround is considered to be the transactions cost of a bet, in that it reveals
6Virtual in the sense that no real money is traded on outcomes; instead some form of
virtual money is traded.
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the cost to a bettor of securing a guaranteed return. Amongst bookmakers it
is generally argued that the overround reflects the bookmaker’s margin. On
prediction markets, where it has been shown to be smaller (Vaughan Williams,
1999), it still reflects the margin of those trading, since all prediction markets
levy some explicit commission charge on net winnings.
In an early investigation of market efficiency of bookmakers, Pope and Peel
(1989) consider bookmaker prices which are posted some time in advance of
the sporting events in question, English football matches. They found some
evidence for inefficiency, but an absence of profitable trading strategies. As
already mentioned, such early studies consider a very different betting industry
to what exists now, and as such our results may differ somewhat to those found
under a much more heavily regulated industry.
Forrest et al. (2005) consider five bookmakers in the midst of the extensive
deregulation of the betting industry, of which three are found in our dataset
of 58 bookmakers. With such a number of bookmakers, it is not practical to
consider the differences between individual bookmakers, but we do in passing
make reference to different relative performances by different bookmakers, not
least because during their sample period (1997–2002) the authors note that
competitive pressures were increasing, and also the performance of bookmakers
improved. As with Pope and Peel (1989), in the sample period covered by
Forrest et al. (2005) bookmakers posted their prices up to five days before a
match began, and generally did not change them. As we detail in Section 3,
this is generally not the case now with in-play betting, and constantly updating
prediction markets forcing bookmakers to be constantly updating their prices
even during matches. Almost overlapping, Deschamps and Gergaud (2012)
consider forecasts of English football matches between 2002 and 2006 for five
bookmakers (two in common, William Hill and Ladbrokes) in a study of market
efficiency, and uncover a number of biases.
Forrest and Simmons (2000) appraise newspaper tipsters forecasting English
football matches from all four professional divisions, focussing in particular on
three newspapers. They find that while tipster predictions are an improvement
on those generated at random, tipsters do not appear to make use of all available
information when constructing forecasts, and only one appeared to make use of
private information. Finally, they find that a combination of all three tipsters
provides better predictions than each forecast individually. This study differs
from ours in that our tipsters are self-selected users of a website, rather than
being employed by national newspapers to provide predictions. Furthermore,
in this paper we only make use of the average of a group of tipsters, rather than
each individual’s forecast, and as such we already consider forecast combinations
in the context of tipsters, rather than each individual prediction.
Other investigators (Croxson and Reade, 2011; Franck et al., 2010) have
found prediction markets to outperform bookmakers in terms of odds offered and
also liquidity available, although not necessarily in terms of forecast accuracy.
This investigation to some extent mirrors forecast comparisons of opinion polls
and prediction markets for political elections (Kou and Sobel, 2004; Leigh and
Wolfers, 2006; Berg et al., 2008; Rothschild, 2009).
We now describe the various methods we use to compare forecasts.
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2.1 Percentage of Correct Forecasts
A very basic method for appraising forecasts is to consider how often these
forecasts are correct. The percentage of times a forecast is correct is sometimes
referred to as the hit rate. While such a method is straightforward when we
consider a specific event with some numerical value, it is a little trickier when we
are considering probabilistic forecasts of multi-outcome events such as football
matches. We must first determine what event has been predicted in any given
match, and then determine whether that event occurred. As a simple rule, we
take the event in a given match for a forecaster that has the highest probability.
For tipsters this is the event that the simple majority of tipsters predicts will
occur. We then calculate how often that predicted event actually occurs.
2.2 Mean Forecast Error
We have forecasts ŷiks of event k in match i by forecaster s, and actual match
outcomes yik. The latter is binary, but considering its average, we get some
sense of whether forecasters predict particular events, on average, the right
number of times. The forecast error for event k in match i for forecast source
s is:
êiks = yik − ŷiks. (2)
A simple measure of forecast accuracy is to take the average of these forecast
errors across matches (i) and sources (s):
MEk =
1
N
∑
i
∑
s
êiks, (3)
where N denotes the total sample size for event k. We consider mean errors
separately for each match outcome, as all previous studies noted in Section 2
have noted distinct differences between these events. The mean error (ME)
provides a measure of the bias of a forecast source. If we observe ME > 0 this
implies that that on average the event k occurs more frequently than source s
predicts; source s forecasts are biased down. Conversely, if we observe ME > 0
this suggests forecasts are biased upwards, as events occur less frequently than
their forecasts would suggest.
2.2.1 Favourite-Longshot Bias
The simple bias as reflected in (3) is not the only bias of interested when consid-
ering forecasts. Deschamps and Gergaud (2012) consider biases in bookmaker
prices, and refer in particular to the favourite-longshot bias. This bias, noted
in many contexts (see for example Vaughan Williams and Paton, 1997; Wood-
land and Woodland, 1994), reflects that favourites are priced such that they win
more often than their odds imply, and outsiders win less often. To investigate
this, one looks at either observed outcomes or theoretical returns as a function
of implied probabilities. Given that tipster predictions are not bets, it makes
less sense to think in terms of returns in this context. Outcomes ought to be
a positive function of implied forecast probabilities, and this relationship ought
to be one-for-one, in the absence of any bias: E (yik) = E (ŷiks). If some events
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occur more often than their forecast implies, then E (yi′k′) > E (ŷi′k′s) for that
subset of events i′ ∈ i, k′ ∈ k, and positive returns could be made. Specifi-
cally if outcomes that are favourites occur more often, then E (y′ik
′) > E (ŷi′k′s)
for events that are most likely, while E (y′ik
′) < E (ŷi′k′s) for all other types of
events; this is the favourite-longshot bias. One method to test its existence is
to run the OLS regression of yik on ŷiks:
yik = α+ βŷiks + eis, (4)
and test whether α = 0 and β = 1 such that E (yik) = E (ŷiks). If β > 1 then
the favourite-longshot bias exists, as more probable events (yik, a probability,
nearer to one) occur more often than their implied probability dictates they
should, while less probable events (yik nearer to zero) occur less often than
their odds suggest.
It is of interest to consider the favourite-longshot bias regression (4) along a
number of dimensions in our dataset, as many explanations for the bias exist.
The two main explanations are risk love and misperceptions (Snowberg and
Wolfers, 2010). The bias suggests that bets with low odds and hence high risk
have lower payoffs, and the only way to reconcile this within the neoclassical
paradigm is to assume risk loving agents. On the other hand, it may simply
be that agents are unable to distinguish between the likelihood of events with
small probabilities, moving towards the behavioural economic paradigm. An-
other hypothesis is that information costs contribute to the bias being priced
into bookmaker odds (Hurley and McDonough, 1995); while bookmakers are
equipped to collect information regarding likely outcomes, bettors are not. In
the limit, bettors are totally uninformed and would back all events equally, and
as such it is in the interest of bookmakers to price favourites more attractively,
and outsiders less so, in order to encourage bettors to back the favourite over
the outsiders. Supporting this hypothesis, Vaughan Williams and Paton (1997)
found the favourite-longshot bias to be stronger in lower grade horse races where
information is more costly to obtain, and in finding similar patterns on predic-
tion markets, (see Smith et al., 2006) offers further support for the information
costs hypothesis.
We can check this hypothesis using our dataset as we collect data from
five different English football leagues, all differing in the volume of information
available for; in this sense our work mirrors that of Vaughan Williams and
Paton (1997). By looking at tipster forecasts, we can provide new insight
into the bias; clearly tipsters bear no risk in making their predictions, hence
bias observed cannot be explained by this. Conversely, if the explanation is
misperceptions, then the bias amongst tipster predictions ought to be similar
to that of prediction markets; there seems little reason to believe that when
making forecasts upon which money is staked that misperceptions should be
systematically different to those where this risk is absent, particularly since
those making forecasts on a website such as OddsPortal likely bet themselves.
Finally, tipster forecasts allow us to appraise how individual bettors process
information and thus distinguish favourites from longshots, a key component
of the information costs explanation. Hence, assuming both predictions on
a prediction market and on a tipster forum are in all other respects identical,
considering both ought to allow adjudication between these two explanations.
8
2.3 Mean absolute forecast error
The mean absolute forecast error is:
MAE =
1
N
∑
i
∑
s
|êis| , (5)
where N is the total number of forecasts, i refers to the event being forecast, and
s to the forecast source. The MAE gives a measure of absolute forecast error
size by ignoring the sign of the forecast error (of importance for determining
bias). Thus rather than allowing positive and negative errors to cancel out as
in the mean forecast error, the mean absolute error gives a sense of how large
each forecast error is, in absolute terms.
2.4 Mean squared forecast error
The mean squared forecast error is:
MSE =
1
N
∑
i
∑
s
ê2is, (6)
and as with the mean absolute error, provides a measure of the size of errors
independent of their sign. Additionally, by squaring each error, we get an
approximation to the variance of forecasts, assuming they are unbiased. This
may be of interest when considering our signal vs. noise information hypothesis;
if extra information for higher leagues contains a significant proportion of noise,
this would be expected to only increase the variance of forecasts rather than
their accuracy.
The mean squared forecast error is often referred to as the Brier score (Brier,
1950) in the context of binary outcomes like those we consider in this paper.
The MSE can differ from the MAE, and the usual explanation for this is that
there may be a number of particularly large forecast errors; squaring affords
them a greater weight than taking absolute values.
2.5 Profitability of betting strategies
Finally we attempt to add some economic significance to results by considering
hypothetical trading strategies. The strategies are hypothetical in that they
were not actually carried out, and had they been carried out bookmaker and
prediction market prices may have differed to those observed in our dataset.
Nonetheless if we assume sufficiently small bets were placed (say a pound in
each case) then we can be reasonably confident that this would not have influ-
enced market outcomes.7 At least two ideas underly this appraisal of betting
markets; the first is that any positive expected returns suggests the market is in-
efficient in that trading had not taken place to arbitrage away any such profitable
differences in prices. The second suggests that if by looking at combinations
of bookmaker and prediction market prices significantly different returns can
7As will be seen later, there is some range in the amount of liquidity available on prediction
markets, and a tiny number of markets have such small amounts of liquidity available that
this strategy might have had some impact, but this is a handful of matches in a sample of
many thousands.
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be made, it suggests there are economically meaningful differences between the
two markets. We also make use of tipster predictions to inform a betting strat-
egy to again determine whether tipster forecasts are economically meaningfully
different from bookmaker and prediction market forecasts.
3 Data
Our dataset is composed of 7622 matches, 1095 from the EPL, 1640 from each
of the ECH and LG1, 1642 from LG2 and 1605 from the CPD.8 We have
forecasts from bookmakers, prediction markets and tipsters, and overall we have
425,688 observations, on average 55.8 observations per match. In our dataset,
42.9% of matches result in home wins, 26.6% as draws, and 30.5% as away wins.
Similarly, the average prediction from all of our sources for a home win is 43.3%,
for a draw 26.8% and for an away win 29.9%.
The observations we have per match are split into three types, as already
indicated: bookmaker prices, prediction market prices, and tipster forecasts.
We now discuss each in turn.
3.1 Bookmakers
Our dataset contains odds posted by 58 different bookmakers for all three events;
we also have information on the percentage of bets that were paid out by each
bookmaker for each match. None of these bookmakers report odds for every
single matche in our dataset, but 53 provide prices on matches in all five leagues,
and all but one provide prices on the top four leagues.9 The bookmakers listed
rank from traditional UK bookmakers like Ladbrokes and William Hill to more
recent market entrants such as FortunaWin and SportsBetting. Many betting
companies have different geographical focusses, with, for example, NordicBet
focussing on the Nordic countries. Oddsportal provides a ranking of the differ-
ent bookmakers it sources prices from, based on how often payouts are made on
bets, the rating provided by www.BookmakersReview.com, and also the ratings
that Oddsportal users provide.
As a panel dataset, our bookmakers thus form a reasonably balanced panel;
over a period of three years there appears to be no market exits, and a small
number of entrances (see Table 7 in the Appendix on page 26 for information),
although it is to be noted that some of the bookmakers used in other stud-
ies cited earlier (e.g. StanleyBet, Oddset and GameBookers) do not appear in
this dataset. It is not clear the basis upon which OddsPortal collects odds
information from particular bookmakers, but nonetheless with on average 50.6
bookmakers per match we have a rich picture of bookmaker odds during our
sample period. A final point to note is that some smaller bookmakers may rely
on a single source of information for their prices, rather than each individually
employing odds-setters. This may result in particularly high correlations be-
tween particular bookmakers that belong to a specific group. Most correlations
8The EPL is composed of 20 whereas the other divisions have 24 teams, meaning that
there are 380 matches in the EPL per season, and 552 in the others (plus end-of-season
playoff matches).
9BetOnline, Instant Action Sports, Intertops, SportsBetting and The Greek are the book-
makers who do not provide CPD prices.
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between bookmakers are above 0.9, which could cause problems for interpreting
standard errors, although our huge sample size reduces this problem somewhat.
3.2 Prediction Markets
Our dataset includes prices and available liquidity for two betting exchanges
for all observations, Betfair and Betdaq, and an additional exchange for all
our EPL and Football League observations, Matchbook. By available liquidity
we mean amounts of money available for events to be either backed (bought)
or laid (sold). Betfair and Betdaq have been in operation since 2000, while
Matchbook only entered into European sports markets in 2012. Betfair is
by some distance the largest prediction market offering sports bets, and this
is reflected in the amount of money available to back bets in our dataset; in
total Betfair has £68.1m available over the matches in our dataset, followed
by Betdaq with £10.8m and Matchbook with £7.4m. Betfair charges between
2 and 5% commission, Betdaq charges 3% on ‘most markets’, and Matchbook
charges 1%.10
Of particular interest from prediction markets are the back and lay prices.
As both prediction markets reflect user activity, we can infer some degree of
strength in predictions, as well as popularity of particular matches. The amount
of money available to lay an event reflects the number of bettors willing to back
that event, but who as yet have not been matched with another bettor willing
to lay the event, and as such a large volume of money available to lay an event
must reflect the strength of sentiment amongst bettors for that particular event.
Other information we have with the back and lay prices is the betting equivalent
of the bid-ask spread: the difference between the price to back the event, and
the price to lay it. A larger spread might reflect a less liquid market (as would
volume information), and may impinge on the quality of forecasts produced.
3.3 Tipsters
Our dataset includes the outcomes of tips made by website users; as of April
17 2014, the website listed 1967 users who had made at least 50 predictions on
football matches alone. For any given match the number of users providing pre-
dictions varies (and is difficult to collect information on), but for EPL and CPD
matches the number predicting appears to depend on the number of matches
taking place elsewhere at a given time, and the interest level in that match
(hence Manchester United matches attract more attention than Welling United
matches), and the most interesting matches attract in excess of 300 forecasts in
both these extreme leagues in our sample, whereas some of the less interesting
matches can have fewer than 10 forecasts.
An important point related to these tipster forecasts is that they are not all
by the same tipsters, and it is unlikely that one tipster has forecast all matches in
our sample. In that respect this data more accurately resembles a pooled cross
section rather than a panel of tipsters. Of the forecasters on oddsportal, there is
a considerable range of quality of forecasts, as measured by ROI, which ranges
from 291.9% to -72.4%. For each match the proportion of tipsters picking each
10The commission charges by Betfair may differ based on the country in which a trader is
based.
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event to occur is reported, hence if 50 people out of a total number of forecasters
for a given match of 100 predict the home win to occur, 50% is reported.
Rather than being employed by newspapers to provide tips each week, the
tipsters in our dataset are a self-selected sample of OddsPortal users. As with
newspaper tips, their forecasts are made public, as the website resembles a
social network site as tipsters have public profiles and can comment on the tips
others make for sporting events. We can surmise that given these tipsters have
become registered users of the OddsPortal website, they are seeking to bet on
sporting outcomes, and hence will likely alongside making their tips place bets
on events. While it is less reasonable to anticipate that these tipster forecasts
have any impact on bookmaker prices, it seems plausible to imagine that the
strengths of tips made on the website might reflect the strength of betting on
prediction markets; the fundamental difference being that when posting tips
regarding outcomes the only risk users face is that of social embarrassment,
whereas when placing bets on betting exchanges or bookmakers (which of course
is anonymous) there is financial risk without any immediate social risk.
4 Results
4.1 Percentage of Correct Forecasts
Considering first the percentage of correct forecasts, we take the outcome fore-
cast as that with the highest probability, and calculate how often that event
occurs. Overall, 47.6% of the time forecasts in our database are correct, al-
though this differs between divisions, as might be expected based on the earlier
discussion regarding information and predictability. Potentially following this
hypothesis, 55.28% of EPL forecasts are correct, the highest proportion. Fol-
lowing this, ECH and LG1 matches are forecast correctly between 45 and 46% of
the time, and in LG2 this falls to 43.88%. Countering the hypothesis, however,
is CPD, our lowest league, where 49.11% of matches are forecast correctly. All
these differences are statistically significant, countering our earlier hypothesis
since a league in which information costs are higher, CPD, has a greater number
of correct forecasts than all Football League divisions.
Breaking down the forecasts by season does not affect the rankings; in gen-
eral, forecasts in 2014 are statistically significantly better than both previous
years, and forecasts in 2013 were the worst overall, but in each year CPD fore-
casts were better than Footbal League ones. One alternative explanation for
this unexpected finding is the mix of professional and semi-professional teams
in the CPD; in the EPL and Football League all teams are professional, and as
such it might be that the distinction between professional and amateur teams
yields an extra element of predictability in the CPD.
Considering our different types of forecast, in Table 1, we find that in all di-
visions bookmakers and prediction markets outpredict tipsters by a statistically
significant margin (p-value 4.4%, not reported elsewhere), whilst the difference
between the two is statistically insignificant. This result is consistent with
Spann and Skiera (2009). In the CPD tipsters forecast correctly 46.24% of the
time, while bookmakers and prediction markets forecast correctly 49.08% and
49.16% of the time, respectively. In the EPL all percentages are higher, with
tipsters forecasting correctly 52.69% of the time, and bookmakers and prediction
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EPL ECH LG1 LG2 CPD
Betting exchanges 55.91 45.39 46.94 44.29 49.08
Bookmakers 55.26 45.34 46.79 43.91 49.16
User predictions 52.69 43.46 43.60 40.16 46.24
Table 1: Percentage of forecasts that turn out to be correct, by type of forecast
and league.
markets predicting correctly 55.26% and 55.91% of the time, respectively.
When considering individual prediction markets and bookmakers, all are (in-
dividually) significantly better than tipsters at a 5% level of significance; how-
ever, reflecting the high correlation between bookmaker and prediction market
prices, jointly the prices are insignificant.11 Of the prediction markets, Match-
book’s, The Greek’s and Instant Action Sports forecasts are all 5 percentage
points better than those of tipsters.
Finally considering prediction markets, the amount of available liquidity for
the home win market does increase the accuracy of predictions, and although
the effect is statistically significant, it is small; an extra thousand pounds of
liquidity only increases accuracy by a third of a percentage point. An extra
thousand pounds of liquidity in the away win market has a similar effect, al-
though this is only borderline significant. An extra thousand pounds in the
draw market reduces the accuracy of forecasts by a slightly larger amount, but
again this effect is statistically borderline, and further there are few markets in
our entire dataset where more than a thousand pounds is available to back or
lay the draw.12 These results may give some credence to the so-called ‘wisdom
of crowds’ hypothesis (Surowiecki, 2004), as they suggest that the bigger are
markets, the better is information processed in forming forecasts (at least for
home and away wins).
4.2 Mean Forecast Errors
Turning to mean forecast errors, these are presented in the first panel of Table 2
by type of forecast, league and event (home win, draw or away win). In terms
of magnitude, the errors from tipsters are always larger than bookmakers or
prediction markets, but often the signs are different. Bookmaker and predic-
tion market errors are never statistically significantly different from each other.
Tipster forecasts are biased upwards (negative sign) for home and away wins
(except in the ECH), but biased down for the draw; hence tipsters under-predict
the frequency with which draws occur, and over-predict how often outright re-
sults occur. There are no such clear patterns for either betting exchanges
or bookmakers. Although small, the errors are all statistically significantly
different from zero.
A commonly noted bias in forecasts produced by bookmakers and prediction
markets is the favourite-longshot bias: favourite outcomes occur more often than
their odds (hence forecast) implies, while unfavoured outcomes occur less often.
Within our dataset we can identify favourites (events with highest implied prob-
ability) and outsiders (lowest implied probability) for each event and then assess
11For details see Table 6 the Appendix.
12About 14% of observations have more than a thousand pounds available.
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error abs error squared error
home draw away fav out home draws away home draw away
betting exchanges EPL -0.004 -0.004 0.008 0.011 0.012 0.414 0.364 0.354 0.206 0.180 0.178
bookmakers EPL 0.001 -0.004 0.003 0.018 0.007 0.419 0.369 0.360 0.206 0.182 0.179
user predictions EPL -0.073 0.092 -0.020 -0.201 0.130 0.388 0.317 0.323 0.242 0.203 0.203
betting exchanges ECH -0.011 0.004 0.007 -0.015 0.013 0.468 0.396 0.396 0.234 0.199 0.199
bookmakers ECH -0.004 0.000 0.004 -0.005 0.009 0.470 0.397 0.399 0.235 0.199 0.200
user predictions ECH -0.115 0.103 0.012 -0.253 0.193 0.456 0.357 0.375 0.297 0.242 0.239
betting exchanges LG1 -0.009 0.002 0.007 -0.002 -0.015 0.459 0.395 0.399 0.229 0.199 0.201
bookmakers LG1 -0.003 -0.001 0.004 0.008 -0.013 0.462 0.396 0.401 0.229 0.198 0.200
user predictions LG1 -0.089 0.125 -0.036 -0.288 0.213 0.448 0.338 0.403 0.303 0.248 0.270
betting exchanges LG2 -0.015 0.002 0.013 -0.012 0.014 0.467 0.399 0.411 0.232 0.201 0.209
bookmakers LG2 -0.013 0.003 0.009 -0.005 0.015 0.468 0.401 0.413 0.232 0.201 0.209
user predictions LG2 -0.093 0.116 -0.024 -0.302 0.221 0.461 0.353 0.409 0.309 0.252 0.268
betting exchanges CPD 0.007 -0.015 0.008 0.006 0.007 0.454 0.380 0.397 0.227 0.187 0.200
bookmakers CPD 0.011 -0.018 0.007 0.019 -0.008 0.458 0.381 0.400 0.228 0.186 0.200
user predictions CPD -0.079 0.120 -0.041 -0.287 0.202 0.447 0.295 0.394 0.315 0.221 0.267
Table 2: Mean forecast errors, squared forecast errors and absolute forecast
errors by type of forecast and league.
forecast errors and hence bias for these particular types of events. The fourth
and fifth columns contain the forecast errors in these cases. For favourites, in
general tipsters show a much greater bias, and in all cases upwards (indicating
that favourites are under-predicted, the reverse favourite-longshot bias). For
prediction markets and bookmakers for favourites in the EPL and CPD forecasts
are biased down (favourite-longshot bias), but for the Football League generally
forecasts are biased up (suggesting reverse favourite-longshot bias). For out-
siders, tipsters again display bias consistent with the reverse favourite-longshot
bias, forecasting outsiders to win more often than they actually do, but inter-
estingly with the exception of LG1, bookmakers and prediction markets also
display bias in this direction, suggesting that underlying the favourite-longshot
bias is an over-prediction of favourites to win rather than an under-prediction
of outsiders to win.
However, it should be noted that this is not the standard method for de-
tecting the existence, or otherwise, of favourite-longshot bias. The numbers in
Table 2 may be distorted by events for which all outcomes are similarly likely;
more common methods for detecting the bias described in Section 2.2.1 will now
be employed.
Considering (4) on our dataset as a whole, column (1) of Table 3 reports
this; we see that α = 0.006 and β = 0.983, and the F-test that α = 0 and
β = 1 is rejected. The β coefficient less than unity suggests that, overall, there
is negative favourite-longshot bias in our sample; this, however, mixes together
prediction markets, tipsters and bookmakers. The second column of Table 3
adds dummy variables to (4) in the following manner:
yi = α(1, Dj) + βŷis(1, Dj) + eis, (7)
where Dk contains dummy variables, in the first instance for the type of forecast,
and both α and β are vectors of coefficients. Such a construction enables the
entire regression model to vary for bookmakers, tipsters and prediction markets,
and allows us, via the testing of the appropriate elements of the α and β vectors,
whether the differences are statistically significant.
We note from column (2) that for the reference group in the regression,
bookmakers, α = −0.019 and β = 1.057, indicative of favourite-longshot bias,
as might be anticipated, amongst bookmakers. The dummies for prediction
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markets are both statistically significant suggesting prediction markets are dif-
ferent to bookmakers, and the implied coefficients are α = 0.0079 and β = 0.976,
indicative of reverse favourite-longshot bias. This finding is in contrast with
that of Vaughan Williams (1999) who found the bias to be merely smaller on
prediction markets rather than of the opposite sign. Finally, the coefficients
on tipsters are much larger, and indicate that α = 0.2344 and β = 0.2969,
implying a substantial reverse favourite-longshot bias, as was indicated by the
earlier results in Table 2. These results would appear to support the Hurley
and McDonough (1995) information costs explanation for the favourite-longshot
bias in the sense that when bettors are not betting, they display an inability
to determine favourites (in terms of objective probability) consistent with high
information costs, and hence bookmakers must over-price favourites in order to
attract bettors to back them, and equivalently discourage bettors from backing
outsiders by posting unattractive odds. That bookmakers do not appear to
exploit this opportunity need not be evidence against the information costs hy-
pothesis, but may instead indicate that bookmakers simply do not have sufficient
price-setting power to act, consistent with the increased competitiveness in the
industry as a whole since the late 1990s. Considering the risk-preferences inter-
pretation, the evidence appears less supportive; prediction markets are driven
by bettor activity that has financial risk, whereas tipster predictions incur no
financial risk; as such, the absence of strong favourite-longshot bias in prediction
markets suggests that risk loving preferences on the part of bettors cannot ex-
plain the bias. The strong reverse favourite-longshot bias of tipster predictions
suggests a willingness amongst bettors to back the underdog, albeit without any
reference to the risk associated with such an action on a prediction market.
It may be that a graphical representation of (4) is helpful. In Figure 2
we provide this; we group all forecasts in a particular probability range, and
consider how often these events occur. If a forecast source is unbiased, we
should expect that, for example, events forecast to occur at a probability of
50% should happen, on average, 50% of the time. If this was the case, then
if we plot forecasts in particular probability ranges against the frequency with
which those forecast events occur, the resulting plots should appear along a
45-degree line. In Figure 2 we do this for bookmakers, prediction markets
and tipsters separately, and plot a 45-degree line. The solid black circles are
tipster forecasts, the empty diamonds are prediction market forecasts and the
crosses are bookmaker forecasts. With bookmakers and prediction markets
we observe that forecasts for very likely events (those forecast to occur with
probabilities 60% or more) all tend to actually occur more often than they are
forecast to, while those less likely events (for example those forecast to occur
with probability 20%) seem to occur less frequently than forecasts imply. This
is consistent with the favourite-longshot bias already mentioned. We can also
note what was hinted at in Table 2 — that it is events forecast to very likely
occur (those with probabilities nearer to 100%, favourites) where the bias is
much stronger, relative to events unlikely to occur (outsiders).
Tipster forecasts show, very strongly, the opposite of this, or the reverse-
favourite-longshot bias; events forecast to be unlikely to happen, outsiders, occur
more often than those forecast imply; events forecast with probabilities less
than 30% almost always occur more often than their forecasts imply, and events
forecast to occur with probabilities above around 40% (reflecting that there are
three events in a football match) seem to occur less often than their forecasts
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Figure 2: Graphical representation of bias from predictions from bookmakers,
prediction markets and tipsters.
suggest they should.
In column (3) of Table 3 we additionally add dummy variables to allow the
regression model to be different for each of our leagues as well as for each type of
forecast, in order to investigate the impact of information costs. The reference
group is bookmakers for the EPL, and hence the line “Forecast, β” gives the
actual β coefficient in that circumstance, which is β = 1.078, suggesting a
favourite-longshot bias, as indicated earlier on. If we then run down the leagues
(the ECH, LG1, LG2 and CPD lines), we can learn something of the impact of
higher informational costs when posting odds. Rather than being uniform as
might be expected when moving down to increasingly obscure leagues, there is
no clear pattern; for ECH the dummy is sufficiently large that it creates a slight
reverse favourite-longshot bias, for LG1 there is no significant difference from
β = 1.078, for LG2 a stronger reverse favourite-longshot bias results, while for
CPD there is a slightly smaller favourite-longshot bias. As such there is no
clear pattern in terms of information costs, nor predictability, for the favourite-
longshot bias in bookmaker forecasts. This is in contrast to the results of
Vaughan Williams and Paton (1997) who found that for more obscure horse
races the bias was larger.
Turning to prediction markets, we must first add in the prediction markets
dummy, and then consider the league dummies in turn. For prediction markets
the favourite-longshot bias is greatly mitigated in the EPL but still exists, and
in addition to the league dummies (e.g. the line ECH), we must also add in
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the effect of the interaction dummy between the league and prediction markets,
e.g. “Prediction Markets, EPL”. Apart from for the CPD, this results in a
reverse favourite-longshot bias for all other leagues (hence ECH, LG1 and LG2).
Again this gives no simple pattern as we move to leagues for which there are
greater information costs. As with simple bias earlier, however, it might be
that the professional/amateur distinction in the CPD renders the league much
more predictable than any of the Football League divisions, and hence we see
favourite-longshot bias, but when we move into markets for which it is harder
to predict (high costs of accumulating information), in the Football League,
we find a reverse favourite-longshot bias. This would appear to be evidence
contradicting the information hypothesis for the favourite-longshot bias.
Finally, for tipsters, we see that for each of the non-EPL divisions, the re-
verse favourite-longshot bias increases, and is worst for LG1 and CPD, where
the β coefficients are smaller than 0.3, though remaining significantly greater
than zero. These results, it might be argued, reflect the information costs indi-
vidual agents face relative to bookmakers distinctly, as agents are simply unable
to forecast outcomes particularly well. What is perhaps confounding for the
information-costs explanation of the favourite-longshot bias is that bookmakers
do not appear to exploit this more strongly, since the bias is weaker than the
EPL or negative beneath the EPL.
While it might be hypothesised that information costs are greater for indi-
vidual bettors than for bookmakers, this does not explain the substantial differ-
ence between tipster forecasts and prediction market forecasts, which are also,
in principle, based on the actions of individual bettors. These results may thus
suggest that the more sophisticated bettors on prediction markets (not those
placing their tips on the website) are able to exploit the uninformed bettors,
and the result is that there is little, if any bias on the prediction markets, while
by and large the favourite-longshot bias still remains for bookmakers to induce
bettors to back favourites rather than outsiders. It is worth noting though that
for two of our five divisions a reverse favourite-longshot bias exists, suggesting
perhaps that in those markets competitive pressure are such that bookmakers
have diminished price setting power.
4.3 Mean Absolute Forecast Errors
Turning to mean absolute errors (MAEs, see equation (5), we are considering
the absolute magnitude of errors and ignoring the direction of errors. As such
we focus more on just how big errors are, rather than any particular biases
that exist. A striking result for MAEs is that we find that tipsters forecast
marginally, but statistically significantly, better than bookmakers and prediction
markets for all match events in all divisions, apart from for the away win in LG1.
Prediction markets have significantly smaller absolute errors than bookmakers
for the home and away win markets, but for the draw market the difference is
only significant at a 10.5% level of significance. Absolute errors are smaller
for EPL matches than CPD matches, but for the home win and draw markets,
ECH errors are larger than CPD matches.
The result in favour of tipsters is at odds with Spann and Skiera, who found
that tipsters forecast significantly worse than prediction markets and bookmak-
ers, and Forrest and Simmons (2000) also noted a poor performance of tipsters.
However, Spann and Skiera do not consider MAEs in their study.
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Table 3: Favourite-Longshot Bias Regression Results
Dependent variable:
outcome
(1) (2) (3)
Constant (α) 0.006∗∗∗ −0.019∗∗∗ −0.026∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
Prediction Markets 0.027∗∗∗ 0.020∗∗
(0.004) (0.008)
Tipsters 0.253∗∗∗ 0.182∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.013)
CPD −0.016∗∗∗
(0.004)
ECH 0.029∗∗∗
(0.004)
LG1 −0.001
(0.004)
LG2 0.038∗∗∗
(0.004)
Prediction Markets, ECH 0.003
(0.013)
Prediction Markets, LG1 0.019
(0.013)
Prediction Markets, LG2 0.004
(0.014)
Prediction Markets, CPD 0.013
(0.013)
Tipsters, ECH 0.054∗∗∗
(0.017)
Tipsters, LG1 0.098∗∗∗
(0.017)
Tipsters, LG2 0.072∗∗∗
(0.018)
Tipsters, CPD 0.095∗∗∗
(0.017)
Forecast (β) 0.983∗∗∗ 1.057∗∗∗ 1.078∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.004) (0.006)
Prediction Markets −0.081∗∗∗ −0.059∗∗∗
(0.012) (0.022)
Tipsters −0.760∗∗∗ −0.545∗∗∗
(0.012) (0.029)
ECH −0.087∗∗∗
(0.011)
LG1 0.003
(0.011)
LG2 −0.114∗∗∗
(0.012)
CPD 0.047∗∗∗
(0.010)
Prediction Markets, ECH −0.010
(0.035)
Prediction Markets, LG1 −0.056
(0.036)
Prediction Markets, LG2 −0.013
(0.039)
Prediction Markets, CPD −0.038
(0.034)
Tipsters, ECH −0.162∗∗∗
(0.039)
Tipsters, LG1 −0.295∗∗∗
(0.038)
Tipsters, LG2 −0.217∗∗∗
(0.039)
Tipsters, CPD −0.284∗∗∗
(0.038)
Observations 1,269,219 1,269,219 1,269,219
R2 0.067 0.070 0.070
Adjusted R2 0.067 0.070 0.070
Residual Std. Error 0.455 (df = 1269217) 0.455 (df = 1269213) 0.455 (df = 1269189)
F Statistic 90,537.880∗∗∗ (df = 1; 1269217) 19,032.190∗∗∗ (df = 5; 1269213) 3,294.345∗∗∗ (df = 29; 1269189)
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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With MAEs, absolute errors more closely approximate the pattern we might
expect to observe when running down through the divisions; all forecast errors
outside the EPL are significantly larger than inside the EPL, although once
outside the EPL there is no obvious deterioration once moving down through
the divisions.
4.4 Mean Squared Forecast Errors
Considering mean squared forecast errors (MSEs, see equation (6), again we
consider the size of errors irrespective of their direction, and furthermore get
an approximation to forecast variances. We find here that tipsters forecast
statistically significantly worst, suggesting that they are more prone than book-
makers to large individual errors, given the absolute error outcomes observed in
the previous section. There is no difference between bookmakers and predic-
tion markets, with the largest t-statistic at -0.4 across the three events. These
results are in line with Spann and Skiera (2009), who also observed similar per-
formance between prediction markets and bookmakers, but inferior performance
for tipsters.
As with absolute errors, when considering squared errors we find that the
EPL has the smallest errors consistently, with all other divisions showing higher
errors, LG2 much larger than the other three divisions, with ECH the smallest.
Hence our hypothesis regarding information costs appears to be upheld with
MSEs. This also helps shed light on whether the extra information provides
signals regarding changes to relative team qualities in matches, or simply rep-
resents noise. If it only represented noise, we would expect EPL and ECH
forecasts to have the largest MSEs, but as this is not the case and indeed the
league with much greater media coverage (the EPL) has much smaller MSEs, it
suggests that the extra information is helpful when making forecasts.
Finally, we can update Forrest et al. (2005) to the present day when consid-
ering the MSE. Forrest et al. report this for William Hill, Ladbrokes and Coral
for the five years of their study (1998–2002), and we can report this for our
three years, 2012, 2013 and 2014. In Table 7 in the Appendix on page 26 we
report scores for individual bookmakers and prediction markets, and highlight
in boldface the three bookmakers in the Forrest et al. study. For home wins
Forrest et al. (2005) found Brier scores of 0.23 and higher, for draws 0.195 or
higher, and for away wins 0.184 or higher. We find that for home wins scores
in the range 0.225 to 0.232, for draws scores in the range 0.193 to 0.195, and for
away wins scores in the range 0.194 to 0.208, suggesting that there has been a
small further improvement since 2002 for home wins and the draw, and a dete-
rioration in performance for forecasting away wins. Such a mixed performance
suggests that much of the improvement in forecast performance took place dur-
ing the sample of Forrest et al. when the bookmaking industry was undergoing
its most severe period of deregulation and restructuring.
4.5 Profitability of Trading Strategies
The differences noted thus far have, for the most part, been remarkably small;
could such small statistical differences have any economic meaning? In order
to ascertain this, we conduct an exercise similar to that of Forrest et al. (2005)
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and Spann and Skiera (2009), namely to appraise trading strategies based on
the advertised odds.
Firstly we consider the returns that would have been made by backing each
event to occur with the same bookmaker.13 The return from such a strat-
egy is equivalent to the overround (though of opposite sign), on average, for
each bookmaker. The average (median) overround is 7.5% (mean 7.1%), and
breaking down by forecast provider the smallest overround is provided by three
bookmakers (5Dimes, Island Casino and Pinnacle Sports) at around 2.4–2.5%.
Hence a strategy of using all bookmakers and backing all outcomes in each match
would yield a negative return on investment of 7.1%. Of the prediction markets
Matchbook offers an overround of 2.8% while Betfair has an average overround
of 4.1%, and Betdaq offers the largest average overround at 13.1%. Betdaq’s
average is clearly driven by some outliers however as its median overround is
just 5.8%, leaving only bookmakers offering particularly large overrounds (In-
terwetten, Redbet, bet-at-home and betCRIS all offer median overrounds of
more than 10%). The overround is often interpreted as the transactions costs
for a bookmaker, and as such is an areaon which bookmakers may compete.
As a result it is perhaps unsurprising that the average overround is smaller in
the EPL (5.4%) than the ECH (6.8%) or the CPD (8.6%), reflecting the more
competitive betting markets.
Then we consider what returns could have been made by betting on each
outcome at the best listed prices for bookmakers. With, on average, 50.6
bookmakers per match, the likelihood is higher that a positive return could be
made following a strategy such as this. Forrest et al. (2005) find mainly negative
returns from following a strategy similar to this amongst their five bookmakers,
but in our sample such a strategy would yield a 0.37% positive return. This
should be cautioned against the trading barriers in place; in order to execute a
strategy such as this, accounts with positive balance would be required at all 58
bookmakers in the sample, and would need to be monitored since losses would
be incurred in a number of these accounts whilst others would make profits. As
a number of these betting companies are located in various parts of the world,
and furthermore many refuse to payout on a number of occasions (on average
in our dataset 93% of bets are paid out on by bookmakers), meaning that this
strategy is likely unprofitable. Nonetheless, the difference between this and
the overall overround gives a clear indication of economic differences between
bookmakers.
Next, we add in the possibility of backing events on a prediction market.
Allowing for this, the return on investment is slightly larger at 0.51%, although
net winnings on our prediction markets are charged commission, complicating
the process. As an interesting aside, we note that 94% of the time bookmakers,
rather than prediction markets, offer the best odds for the home and away
win, and 95% of the time for the draw. These findings are sharp contrast with
Croxson and Reade (2011), who consider in-match prices for football’s European
Championships in 2008.
Finally, a betting strategy could involve laying events. Bettors could lay an
event on a prediction market, having backed the event using a bookmaker. For
13For all bookmakers in our sample, we only use prices from bookmakers that paid out
on bets for that particular match, because an absence of payout suggests that bookmakers
stopped providing prices for that match at some point and cancelled all bets already placed.
Hence using odds with zero payouts would give a false calculation of available returns.
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example, in the Everton vs Crystal Palace match, a bettor could have backed
Everton at 1.40 on BetGun, thus potentially gaining $1.40 if Everton win, for a
$1 stake (lost if Everton do not win). At the same time, the bettor could have
taken $1 of the liquidity available to lay Everton on Matchbook at odds of 1.39,
hence risking paying out $1.39 if Everton win (a 1 cent profit), but potentially
gaining $1 if Everton do not win (breaking even). For such a strategy to be
profitable thus, we need there to be available liquidity to lay an event at a lower
price than the odds offered by a bookmaker. It turns out that these occasions
are few and far between; they occur about 2.5% of the time for the home and
away win markets, and less than 1% of the time for the draw market. A strategy
that traded only when such opportunities existed would net a 36% net return,
but conducting this strategy at all times (backing the highest price, laying the
lowest price) would have produced a net loss on investment of 57%.
Differences in returns from these strategies indicate that the differences be-
tween bookmakers and prediction markets are economically meaningful.
Next, we explore trading strategies based on the predicted outcome of our
tipsters, placing a bet on whichever is the outcome forecast to be most likely.
We hypothetically place our bet with the bookmaker offering the best odds, and
in doing so for all matches in our sample, we find that a 0.18% loss on investment
would be realised, although this number is statistically indistinguishable from
zero. It remains though that positive returns could not be made.
Finally, we explore sentiment via liquidity on betting exchanges. Forrest
and Simmons (2008) investigate whether odds set in the Spanish La Liga are
affected by the number of fans a team has. As a proxy of fan interest in a match,
we consider the total liquidity available for a match on our prediction markets.
We argue this is a good proxy because if we assume a fixed proportion of all
football fans wish to gamble on match outcomes, then matches involving teams
with more fans will have more people seeking to place bets.14 Furthermore,
matches between teams with greater numbers of fans will attract more media
interest, and hence likely more betting interest. We regress the odds reported
by bookmakers on the liquidity available on the prediction markets in what is
essentially a panel estimation.15 These regressions, for home win, draw and
away win odds, are reported in Table 4; the units for total liquidity is thousands
of pounds.16 The regression results suggest that for all outcomes, listed prices
do respond to the amount of liquidity available. Odds for the home win increase
by 0.002 for each extra thousand pounds available, for the draw by 0.009, and for
the away win by 0.023; all of these effects are strongly statistically significant.
Hence the more interest there is in a match, as represented by the amount of
liquidity available on prediction markets, the more favourable odds are offered
by bookmakers, particularly on the away win outcome. This may reflect the
impact of sentiment as considered by Forrest and Simmons (2008); for matches
14Our data is a snapshot of availability at kick-off, yet we argue this is representative of
more general interest in a match.
15Hence it is possible that our regression results suffer from unobserved heterogeneity bias
due, especially as unobserved characteristics of football matches will likely influence how much
money is bet upon them. With a sample size of 385,555 however, we appeal to large sample
results.
16The match with the most liquidity is a match between Manchester City and Cardiff City
on January 18 2014, where £644,376 was available. On average £11,290 was available per
match, although the distribution is skewed by the small number of matches with very large
amounts available; the median available liquidity is £2,207.
21
Table 4: Sentiment Regression Results
Dependent variable:
odds1 odds2 odds3
(1) (2) (3)
Constant 2.344∗∗∗ 3.389∗∗∗ 3.378∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.001) (0.003)
Total Liquidity (000s) 0.002∗∗∗ 0.009∗∗∗ 0.023∗∗∗
(0.00004) (0.00002) (0.0001)
Observations 385,555 385,555 385,556
R2 0.005 0.306 0.169
Adjusted R2 0.005 0.306 0.169
Residual Std. Error 0.897 (df = 385553) 0.440 (df = 385553) 1.767 (df = 385554)
F Statistic 2,067.735∗∗∗ (df = 1; 385553) 169,982.900∗∗∗ (df = 1; 385553) 78,492.240∗∗∗ (df = 1; 385554)
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
with more fans, more favourable odds are offered. Other explanations might be
the impact of heavy trading on bookmakers; if liquidity on prediction markets
proxies activity with bookmakers, this may be the response of bookmakers to
high demand — to increase the attractiveness of odds on the less likely outcome
(away wins happen much less frequently than home wins). It may also reflect
endogeneity; anecdotally it is known that bookmakers use prediction markets
(Betfair, in particular) to cover exposure that they might have in their own
books; with bigger matches may arise larger exposures to outcomes and hence
reason for bookmakers to trade on prediction markets.
Nonetheless, assuming that this result reflects that bookmakers adjust odds
in response to higher levels of demand, it appears consistent with the results
mentioned earlier on the overround; if all odds are becoming more favourable,
then the overround must be falling in size. The overround can be viewed as
the transactions costs imposed by bookmakers; the cost of securing a guaran-
teed return. It would seem natural that for matches where there is greater
demand that competition is keener between bookmakers and hence overrounds
are smaller. A question of greater interest would be whether individual book-
makers differ in this behaviour; our regression in Table 4 forces all bookmakers
to act in the same way, yet it may be that some increase prices much more
than others, yielding potentially more profitable trading strategies. While it is
impractical to report a regression with dummy variables allowing the constant
and slope terms to vary with bookmakers, we can at least note the outcome
of an F test of the significance of those coefficients. The F test of the joint
insignificance of dummies allowing the constant and slope to vary in the re-
gression in Table 4 has a statistic of 10.816 for the home win, 166.66 for the
draw, and 24.672 for the away win, which is compared to the F distribution
with 114 degrees of freedom in the numerator and 385440 in the denominator,
which gives a 95% critical value of 1.22, and a 0.1% critical value of 1.46, and
as such the test is emphatically rejected, suggesting there are important differ-
ences between bookmakers in their response to high market activity. For the
away win, 14 bookmakers increase prices by less than the average, while four by
more than it, suggesting sufficient variation that could be exploitable in more
sophisticated trading strategies that may yield returns higher than the 0.37%
or 0.51% returns reported earlier.
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5 Conclusions
In this paper we have used forecasts of sports events from bookmakers, pre-
diction markets and tipsters to analyse hypotheses regarding forecast accuracy,
information and predictability. Overall, our results seem consistent with the
information hypothesis once we control for the professional/amateur distinction
in the lowest league in our dataset, with increased costs having an impact on
forecast quality, and further our results appear consistent with the idea that
commercial pressures do drive better forecasts, as economic theory would pre-
dict. We find evidence consistent with the information-costs explanation for the
favourite-longshot bias, at least on the part of bettor behaviour if not bookmaker
pricing. We also find evidence which could be consistent with the ‘wisdom of
crowds’ hypothesis. More specifically, we find in general that the forecasts from
tipsters are markedly inferior to the forecasts embodied in odds set by book-
makers, and prices listed on prediction markets for the sporting outcomes we
consider.
A Appendix: Tables
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Name Number of matches forecast
Tipsters 7622
10Bet 7596
12BET 7462
188BET 7611
32Red Bet 7567
5Dimes 7602
888sport 7606
Bestbet 7615
bet365 7610
bet-at-home 7604
Betclic 7481
BetCRIS 7563
Betdaq (back) 7608
Betdaq (lay) 7608
Betfair (back) 7620
Betfair (lay) 7620
Betfred 7593
Betgun 7581
Betinternet 6472
BetOnline 4712
Betrally 1292
BetRedKings 7567
Betsafe 7596
Betsson 7601
BetVictor 7613
Betway 7512
Boylesports 6737
bwin 7439
Coral 7554
Dafabet 7568
DOXXbet 7602
Expekt 7453
FortunaWin 5024
Instant Action Sports 2593
Intertops 4598
Interwetten 7577
Island Casino 7603
Jetbull 7615
Ladbrokes 7595
LEON Bets 7595
Luxbet 6409
MarathonBet 4912
Matchbook (back) 1027
Matchbook (lay) 1027
myBet 7599
NordicBet 7587
Noxwin 7026
Oddsring 2515
Paddy Power 7607
Paf 6137
Pinnacle Sports 7585
Redbet 7469
SBOBET 7604
Sportingbet 7585
SportsBetting 2700
Stan James 7589
The Greek 1712
Tipico 7005
Titanbet 7401
TonyBet 4911
totepool 7571
Unibet 7596
William Hill 7520
Winner 1764
youwin 6343
Table 5: Bookmakers and prediction markets in dataset, along with frequency
of occurrence in dataset.
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Bookmaker Coefficient Standard Error t-statistic p-value
10Bet 0.029006 0.008664 3.348 0.000815 ***
12BET 0.031660 0.008698 3.640 0.000273 ***
188BET 0.030171 0.008660 3.484 0.000494 ***
32Red Bet 0.030567 0.008671 3.525 0.000423 ***
5Dimes 0.029947 0.008663 3.457 0.000546 ***
888sport 0.029038 0.008662 3.352 0.000801 ***
Bestbet 0.028738 0.008659 3.319 0.000905 ***
bet365 0.029576 0.008661 3.415 0.000638 ***
bet-at-home 0.027190 0.008662 3.139 0.001696 **
Betclic 0.028170 0.008693 3.240 0.001194 **
BetCRIS 0.028174 0.008672 3.249 0.001160 **
Betdaq (back) 0.026546 0.008661 3.065 0.002178 **
Betdaq (lay) 0.029878 0.008663 3.449 0.000563 ***
Betfair (back) 0.029495 0.008662 3.405 0.000661 ***
Betfair (lay) 0.031372 0.008665 3.621 0.000294 ***
Betfred 0.028009 0.008665 3.232 0.001228 **
Betgun 0.028233 0.008668 3.257 0.001125 **
Betinternet 0.025768 0.008988 2.867 0.004143 **
BetOnline 0.028452 0.009756 2.916 0.003543 **
Betrally 0.048335 0.015338 3.151 0.001626 **
BetRedKings 0.030303 0.008671 3.495 0.000475 ***
Betsafe 0.029270 0.008664 3.378 0.000730 ***
Betsson 0.029351 0.008663 3.388 0.000704 ***
BetVictor 0.029126 0.008660 3.363 0.000770 ***
Betway 0.028738 0.008685 3.309 0.000937 ***
Boylesports 0.026171 0.008903 2.940 0.003286 **
bwin 0.028971 0.008704 3.328 0.000874 ***
Coral 0.028211 0.008675 3.252 0.001146 **
Dafabet 0.031826 0.008671 3.670 0.000242 ***
DOXXbet 0.028894 0.008663 3.335 0.000852 ***
Expekt 0.026465 0.008701 3.042 0.002352 **
FortunaWin 0.023204 0.009586 2.421 0.015494 *
Instant Action Sports 0.051050 0.011766 4.339 0.000014 ***
Intertops 0.023490 0.009823 2.391 0.016789 *
Interwetten 0.023598 0.008669 2.722 0.006486 **
Island Casino 0.029489 0.008662 3.404 0.000664 ***
Jetbull 0.028869 0.008659 3.334 0.000857 ***
Ladbrokes 0.026039 0.008664 3.005 0.002653 **
LEON Bets 0.029728 0.008664 3.431 0.000601 ***
Luxbet 0.026203 0.009009 2.909 0.003630 **
MarathonBet 0.026299 0.009644 2.727 0.006394 **
Matchbook (back) 0.064485 0.017410 3.704 0.000212 ***
Matchbook (lay) 0.100189 0.024030 4.169 0.000031 ***
myBet 0.028292 0.008663 3.266 0.001092 **
NordicBet 0.029176 0.008666 3.367 0.000761 ***
Noxwin 0.031190 0.008817 3.538 0.000404 ***
Oddsring 0.041240 0.011894 3.467 0.000526 ***
Paddy Power 0.028055 0.008661 3.239 0.001200 **
Paf 0.025994 0.009104 2.855 0.004301 **
Pinnacle Sports 0.030093 0.008667 3.472 0.000516 ***
Redbet 0.028264 0.008696 3.250 0.001154 **
SBOBET 0.031137 0.008662 3.595 0.000325 ***
Sportingbet 0.027587 0.008667 3.183 0.001458 **
SportsBetting 0.031482 0.011604 2.713 0.006670 **
Stan James 0.027732 0.008666 3.200 0.001374 **
The Greek 0.071389 0.013711 5.207 0.000000 ***
Tipico 0.025054 0.008823 2.840 0.004515 **
Titanbet 0.032227 0.008714 3.698 0.000217 ***
TonyBet 0.023747 0.009645 2.462 0.013812 *
totepool 0.027143 0.008670 3.131 0.001745 **
Unibet 0.027953 0.008664 3.226 0.001254 **
William Hill 0.029695 0.008683 3.420 0.000627 ***
Winner 0.048444 0.013550 3.575 0.000350 ***
youwin 0.028456 0.009031 3.151 0.001627 **
Table 6: Output from regression of correct forecasts on forecast type. Reference
group is tipsters, hence all differences relative to tipsters.
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2012 2013 2014
Forecast Source Home win Draw Away win Home win Draw Away win Home win Draw Away win
Tipsters 0.329 0.268 0.281 0.298 0.231 0.258 0.283 0.228 0.236
10Bet 0.226 0.195 0.196 0.231 0.194 0.206 0.224 0.193 0.194
12BET 0.225 0.194 0.194 0.230 0.195 0.206 0.225 0.193 0.194
188BET 0.226 0.195 0.196 0.231 0.194 0.206 0.225 0.193 0.194
32Red Bet 0.225 0.194 0.196 0.231 0.194 0.206 0.225 0.193 0.194
5Dimes 0.225 0.194 0.196 0.231 0.194 0.206 0.224 0.193 0.194
888sport 0.226 0.195 0.197 0.231 0.194 0.207 0.225 0.193 0.194
Bestbet 0.226 0.195 0.196 0.231 0.195 0.206 0.225 0.193 0.194
bet365 0.226 0.195 0.196 0.231 0.194 0.206 0.224 0.193 0.193
bet-at-home 0.226 0.195 0.196 0.231 0.194 0.207 0.225 0.193 0.194
Betclic 0.226 0.195 0.197 0.231 0.195 0.206 0.224 0.193 0.194
BetCRIS 0.226 0.196 0.196 0.231 0.194 0.207 0.225 0.192 0.194
Betdaq (Back) 0.226 0.195 0.196 0.231 0.195 0.206 0.227 0.194 0.196
Betdaq (Lay) 0.226 0.195 0.196 0.232 0.195 0.206 0.225 0.193 0.195
Betfair (Back) 0.226 0.195 0.196 0.231 0.194 0.206 0.224 0.193 0.194
Betfair (Lay) 0.225 0.194 0.195 0.231 0.194 0.206 0.224 0.193 0.194
Betfred 0.226 0.195 0.197 0.231 0.194 0.206 0.225 0.193 0.194
Betgun 0.226 0.195 0.197 0.231 0.194 0.206 0.225 0.193 0.194
Betinternet 0.226 0.195 0.196 0.231 0.195 0.205 0.228 0.196 0.195
BetOnline 0.226 0.191 0.193 0.232 0.194 0.204 0.222 0.196 0.197
Betrally 0.220 0.194 0.193
BetRedKings 0.226 0.195 0.196 0.231 0.194 0.206 0.225 0.193 0.194
Betsafe 0.226 0.195 0.197 0.231 0.195 0.207 0.225 0.193 0.194
Betsson 0.226 0.195 0.197 0.231 0.195 0.207 0.225 0.193 0.194
BetVictor 0.225 0.195 0.195 0.231 0.194 0.206 0.224 0.193 0.194
Betway 0.227 0.194 0.196 0.231 0.194 0.206 0.225 0.193 0.194
Boylesports 0.225 0.195 0.196 0.231 0.195 0.206 0.228 0.199 0.193
bwin 0.227 0.195 0.196 0.232 0.197 0.204 0.225 0.193 0.194
Coral 0.225 0.195 0.197 0.231 0.194 0.207 0.225 0.193 0.194
Dafabet 0.225 0.195 0.196 0.230 0.195 0.206 0.225 0.193 0.194
DOXXbet 0.226 0.195 0.197 0.232 0.195 0.207 0.226 0.193 0.194
Expekt 0.226 0.195 0.197 0.231 0.195 0.206 0.224 0.193 0.194
FortunaWin 0.231 0.194 0.207 0.225 0.193 0.194
Instant Action Sports 0.226 0.193 0.195 0.228 0.195 0.189 0.213 0.187 0.187
Intertops 0.227 0.191 0.194 0.232 0.195 0.203 0.223 0.196 0.197
Interwetten 0.227 0.195 0.198 0.232 0.195 0.207 0.227 0.193 0.195
Island Casino 0.225 0.194 0.196 0.231 0.194 0.206 0.224 0.193 0.194
Jetbull 0.226 0.195 0.196 0.231 0.195 0.206 0.225 0.193 0.194
Ladbrokes 0.226 0.195 0.196 0.232 0.194 0.207 0.226 0.193 0.195
LEON Bets 0.225 0.194 0.196 0.231 0.194 0.206 0.224 0.193 0.194
Luxbet 0.228 0.197 0.191 0.231 0.194 0.206 0.225 0.194 0.194
MarathonBet 0.231 0.194 0.207 0.224 0.193 0.194
Matchbook (Back) 0.227 0.203 0.190 0.217 0.190 0.188
Matchbook (Lay) NaN NaN NaN 0.210 0.188 0.185
myBet 0.226 0.195 0.197 0.231 0.195 0.206 0.225 0.193 0.194
NordicBet 0.226 0.195 0.197 0.231 0.195 0.206 0.225 0.193 0.194
Noxwin 0.225 0.195 0.196 0.232 0.195 0.204 0.225 0.193 0.194
Oddsring 0.217 0.190 0.210 0.224 0.193 0.194
Paddy Power 0.225 0.195 0.196 0.231 0.195 0.207 0.225 0.193 0.194
Paf 0.228 0.199 0.187 0.231 0.195 0.206 0.225 0.193 0.193
Pinnacle Sports 0.226 0.195 0.197 0.231 0.194 0.206 0.224 0.193 0.194
Redbet 0.226 0.196 0.196 0.230 0.195 0.206 0.225 0.193 0.194
SBOBET 0.226 0.195 0.196 0.231 0.194 0.206 0.224 0.193 0.194
Sportingbet 0.226 0.194 0.196 0.231 0.194 0.206 0.225 0.193 0.194
SportsBetting 0.238 0.194 0.195 0.222 0.196 0.197
Stan James 0.226 0.195 0.197 0.231 0.194 0.206 0.224 0.193 0.194
The Greek 0.226 0.191 0.193 0.208 0.198 0.174 0.205 0.166 0.180
Tipico 0.226 0.195 0.196 0.231 0.195 0.206 0.226 0.191 0.197
Titanbet 0.226 0.195 0.196 0.229 0.195 0.205 0.225 0.193 0.193
TonyBet 0.231 0.194 0.207 0.225 0.192 0.194
totepool 0.226 0.195 0.197 0.231 0.194 0.206 0.225 0.193 0.194
Unibet 0.226 0.195 0.196 0.232 0.195 0.206 0.225 0.193 0.194
William Hill 0.226 0.195 0.196 0.231 0.195 0.206 0.226 0.193 0.195
Winner 0.225 0.192 0.194
youwin 0.226 0.195 0.196 0.229 0.195 0.211 0.223 0.192 0.194
Table 7: Mean squared forecast errors, or Brier scores, for all forecast sources
for each year of our sample.
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